Negligence - Sharing of Expenses as Affecting the Host-Guest Relation Under the Automobile Guest Statutes by Lowry, Donald M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 4 Spring 1952 Article 8
Negligence - Sharing of Expenses as Affecting the
Host-Guest Relation Under the Automobile Guest
Statutes
Donald M. Lowry
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation




On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the principal case
was affirmed on April 28, 1952, by a six to three decision. Justice
Douglas in the majority opinion points out that:
"No one is forced to go to the religious classroom, and no re-
ligious exercise of instruction is brought to the classrooms of the
public schools. A student need not take religious instructions.
He is left to his own desires as to the manner or time of his
religious devotions, if any."
40
The Constitution according to the majority opinion does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State. The opinion declares:
"Rather, it (Constitution) studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the
matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each
other-hostil, suspicious and even unfriendly. We find no
constitutional requirements which makes it necessary for gov-
emnment to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against
efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The
government must be neutral, when it comes to competition be-
tween sects... But it can close its doors to suspend its operations
as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuaries
for worship or instructions. No more than that is undertaken
here."4'
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion feels that the New York
released time program is unconstitutional because it is founded upon a
use of the state's power of coercion. Another dissenter, Justice Black,
maintains that the majority opinion abandons the state's historic neu-
trality in the religious sphere.4
2
The principal case presented an excellent opportunity to the Su-
preme Court to clarify the rather confused question of religious educa-
tion for public school pupils. It seems to the writer that in view of wide
practical differences in the many released time programs, the holding
of the United States Supreme Court in the principal case has adopted
the correct approach. The McCollum case did not strike down all
released time programs as such, but only the program before it.
J. JOSEPH CUMMINGS
Negligence-Sharing of Expenses as Affecting the Host-Guest
Relation Under the Automobile Guest Statutes-Plaintiffs, husband
and wife, while on an extended vacation trip with the defendants, in an





in an accident due to the ordinary negligence of the defendant husband.
Plaintiffs agreed to pay for one-half of all the gas, oil, food and lodging
expenses incurred on the trip, although there were four persons in
defendant's family, and only two in the plaintiff's. Defendants and
plaintiffs were friends. Defendant husband did all the driving while
plaintiff husband procured maps and suggested routes to be followed.
Defendants contend that the plaintiffs were barred from recovery for
their injuries by the California Guest Statute.' Held: Plaintiffs by
agreeing to share expenses became as a matter of law passengers for
hire, and were thus taken out of the Guest Statute. Whitmore et uix. v.
French et ux., 235 P. (2d) 3 (Cal., 1951).
The effect of the guest statutes in the states in which they have been
adopted is to render the host liable to his guest only for injury re-ulting
from the host driving while intoxicated or from willful misconduct of
the host.2 On the other hand the host is liable for ordinary negligence
if the person riding with him is said to have given compensation for
his ride. The legislative purposes behind the enactment of these statutes
is an attempt to prevent collusive suits against insurers of the host, to
prevent abuse of hospitality extended and to protect the host from
fraudulent claims by a guest who is the only witness to the accident.
3
The aforementioned reasons necessitate that a distinction be made
between the erms "passenger" and "guest" since when used in con-
nection with the guest statutes they have two entirely different con-
notations. The distinction is well stated by the Restatement of Torts :4
"The phrase 'passenger in a vehicle' is used to denote the
fact that the plaintiff is one being carried by another for hire.
The word 'guest' is used to denote one whom the owner or
possessor of a motor car or other vehicle invites or permits to
ride with him as a gratuity, that is, without any financial return
except such slight benefits as it is customary to extend as part of
ordinary courtesies of the road. .. ."
It has also been held that the term passenger in its legal sense imports
some contractual relation between the parties.5
From an examination of the cases it appears that the weight of
authority supports the rule that the mere sharing of expenses of gasoline
and oil on a trip is not sufficient to constitute "payment" or "compen-
'CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 403: "No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any
other person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of
such vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of such
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of such guest during
such ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that such injury
or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of
said driver."
2 60 C.J.S. MOTOR VEHICLES, §399 (3) (a).
3 60 CJ.S. MoToR VEHICLES, §399 (3) (b).
4 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs, §490, Comment (a).
5 Gale v. Wilbur, 163 Va. 211, 175 S.E. 739 (1934).
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sation" within the meaning of the guest statutes.6 But the above men-
tioned rule has application only in the absence of a prior contractual
agreement to share expenses. Thus where before the trip is begun the
parties have agreed to share the expenses, the majority holds that one
is a passenger and not a guest and the sharing thereby becomes "pay-
ment" or "compensation." 7 The majority view is the one adopted by
the Restatement of Torts :"
". On the other hand, if there is a prior arrangement that
there shall be a substantial sharing of the expenses, the host and
guest relation does not exist. The person so sharing expenses
may be either a passenger or a participant in a joint enterprise."
In summing up these rules it may be said that: (1) in nearly all the
courts, where there is no agreement, the mere sharing of expenses will
not make a guest a passengcr; (2) in a majority of jurisdictions, an
agreement to share expenses will act to convert the guest to a passenger.
By application of the rules laid down in the preceding paragraphs to
the principal case it appears that the decision is in harmony with them.
We have a prior agreement to share expenses and substantial contri-
bution being made. However, the ruling case on the subject in California
prior to this decision was that of McCann v. Hoffman.9 There two
couples took week-end pleasure trips and there existed between them
a tacit and mutual understanding that the expenses were to be equally
shared. There the court in affirming a non-suit said:
"Therefore, where a special tangible benefit to the defendant
was the motivating influence for furnishing the transportation,
compensation may be said to have been given. But it is not given
where the main purpose of the trip is the joint pleasure of the
participants. The paying of a portion of the expense, as for
gasoline and oil consumed on the trip is merely incidental and
does not constitute the moving influence for the transportation
remains the joint social one of reciprocal hospitality and
pleasure."' 0
It is also stated in the dissent by Justice Schauer that the rule as stated
in the Restatement of Torts" has not been the law in California.' 2 Thus
it appears that the principal case is in conflict with the prior decision.
The court found that by paying more than their proportionate share of
the expenses, the plaintiffs conferred upon the defendant a special
6 Jones v. Jones, 312 Ky. 240, 227 S.W. (2d) 182 (1950) ; Duncan v. Hutchinson,
139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E. (2d) 140 (1942) ; Potter v. Juarez, 189 Wash. 476,
66 P. (2d) 290 (1937); See also 155 A.L.R. 575.
7 Smith v. Clute, 227 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E. (2d) 455 (1938) ; Campbell v. Campbell,
104 Vt. 468, 162 A. 379 (1932).8 Supra, note 4.
9 McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. (2d) 279, 70 P. (2d) 909 (1937).
10 Ibid.
1 Supra, note 4.12 See Whitmore v. French, 235 P. (2d) 3, 6 (Cal., 1951) (dissenting opinion).
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benefit and that such benefit was the motivating reason for the
transportation. The court placed much importance on the fact that the
two sons of the defendants went along on the trip and that the share of
expenses remained one-half each. It appears that had there been a
sharing of the expenses in proportion to numbers, the plaintiff would
be barred from recovery by the guest statute.
The advisability of adopting a similar statute in Wisconsin has been
discussed in the MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW. It notes, 3
"... These statutes generally limit the host's liability to cases
of gross negligence. Consequently, they put at rest a great deal
of legislation. They are real measures of economy in the cost of
maintaining the judiciary. They are also a wholesome social
influence in maintaining and encouraging a generous and
altruistic relationship between those blessed with an automobile
and those who cannot afford to own one. The subject recom-
mends itself to legislative consideration."
The failure of the legislature to adopt a guest statue in Wisconsin leads
us to assume that it deems such action unnecessary. A search of the
State Law Index reveals that at present a guest statute in some form is
in force in twenty-five states' 4 and that a majority of these statutes were
enacted between the years of 1933 and 1936 when the automobile began
to fill the nation's highways. The Index also discloses that the last of
these was enacted in 1939 and that none has been enacted since. Thus,
the Wisconsin legislature may have acted wisely in not adopting a guest
statute, as it appears that the present legal machinery governing the
actions by a guest against his host is superior to that of the law proposed.
DONALD M. LOWRY
Sales - Time Condition in Contract for Removal of Growing
Crop -A third party sold and conveyed certain lands to the de-
fendants and sold to the plaintiffs nursery stock growing thereon.
Plaintiffs and defendants then entered into a contract providing that
plaintiffs should have the right to enter upon the land in question at any
time until October 30, 1949, to remove the said nursery stock; that
defendants would not damage, destroy or remove the stock prior to that
date; and that plaintiffs could cultivate the stock up to, and would leave
the land in good condition on, that date. Without excuse, except for
illness immediately prior to October 30, 1949, plaintiffs failed to remove
the stock before the day specified. However, they were ready, willing
and able to do so three days later, and at all times thereafter, but
13 Meissner, Harry V., Liability of Automobile Drivers to Gratuitous Passengers
Under the Wisconsin Law, 18 MARQ. L. R. 3, 19 (1933).
14 Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ill., Ind., Idaho, Kan., Ky., Mont., Neb., Nev.,
N.M., N.D., Ohio, Ore., S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah, Va., Vt., Wash., Wyo.
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